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 The UK Supreme Court on Jurisdiction over successive CMR carriers and European Union Rules 
 
Simone Lamont-Black*  
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In the recent case of British American Tobacco Switzerland SA and others v Exel Europe Ltd and others 1 the 
English courts had to decide on the application and interpretation of the jurisdiction rules of the CMR 2 on 
successive carriers, as well as to reassess the interaction between the jurisdictional rules of international 
transport conventions and EU law.  
 
The CMR, as most other transport conventions, has rules on jurisdiction for claims arising out of the carriage 
of goods under the convention. These jurisdictional rules are enshrined in article 31.1, and for claims 
between successive carriers in article 39.2 of the CMR. In parallel, EU law has its own regime for jurisdiction 
is civil and commercial matters as nowadays enshrined in the Brussels I/Brussels I bis Regulations. The 
Brussels I Regime allows for joinder of defendants at the place of the domicile of one of them. While the 
same domicile rule is absent from the CMR, the latter enables suit of all carriers under different criteria, 
focusing instead on the cornerstones of the transport journey. The application of these jurisdictional 
systems and rules and their potential interaction was key to the BAT saga. 
 
The main CMR question was whether “successive carriers” could be joined to the action against the primary 
carrier by virtue of this defendant’s domicile within the jurisdiction even though neither the successive 
carriers themselves nor the goods’ transportation had any connection to England. In the alternative, the 
questions were whether a jurisdiction agreement between the cargo claimant and the primary carrier could 
be extended to the successive carriers and, further, whether the primary carrier’s place of business could 
constitute the branch or agency through which the successive carriers ’ contracts were made. Last, but not 
least, as the final alternative, the claimants submitted that the jurisdictional rules of the CMR had to be 
supplemented by those of the Brussels I Regulation in order to allow for suit of all defendants at the 
domicile of one of them, here at the domicile of the primary carrier within the English jurisdiction.  
 
The case was hotly debated and proceeded through the instances all the way to the United Kingdom (UK) 
Supreme Court. The reasoning in these decisions is of interest, both in the context of the CMR and as well 
in respect of the interaction of jurisdictional rules between the CMR and the Brussels I /Brussels I bis 
Regulation on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial 
matters. With respect to the latter, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has handed down 
several preliminary rulings relating to transport law and the interaction of carriage conventions with the 
Brussels I Jurisdiction Regime.3 While the general rule is clear, that the Brussels I Jurisdiction Regime is to 
step back to allow application of the specialised rules of specialised conventions,4 the exact application of 
                                                                 
* Assessorin iur. (Germany), Dr. (iur.), Lecturer in International Trade Law at the University of Edinburgh, UK/Scotland. 
1 British American Tobacco Switzerland SA and others v (1) Exel Europe Ltd and (2) H Essers Security Logistics BV and 
another and British American Tobacco Denmark A/S and others v (1) Exel Europe Ltd and (2) Kazemier Transport BV 
[2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, on appeal from [2013] EWCA Civ 1319; [2014] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 503, which was in 
turn on appeal from [2012] EWHC 694 (Comm); [2013] 1 W.L.R. 397; [2012] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 1 (hereafter BAT v Exel). 
2 The United Nations Convention on International Carriage of Goods by Road 1956. 
3 The EU Regulation 1215/2012 of 12 December 2012 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of 
judgments in civil  and commercial matters (recast), OJ L351, 20.12.2012, p1, replac ing as of 10th January 2015 Council 
Regulation (EC) No 44/2001. Regulation 44/2001 itself was based on and superseded the 1968 Brussels Convention 
on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil  and commercial matters , which operated 
between EU Member States. 
4 See Art 71 of the EU Regulation 1215/2012 and Art 57 of the Brussels Convention of 27th September 1968. 
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this principle has been fraught with difficulty and so far was explored by the CJEU in The Tatry5, TNT Express 
Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG,6 Nipponkoa Insurance v Inter-Zuid Transport7 and, more recently, 
Nickel & Goeldner Spedition GmbH v “Kintra” UAB.8 In BAT v Exel, the UK Supreme Court added its view on 
the matter.  
 
After discussing the UK Supreme Court’s decision in BAT v Exel in light of the relevant CJEU case-law, this 
paper further investigates the question of interaction of the jurisdiction regimes of specialised transport 
conventions and Brussels I. It concludes that the import of Brussels I rules should be limited to a “second 
or negative stage” review only, without interfering with “direct, positive” allocation of jurisdiction by 
specialised conventions.   
 
 
II. The facts of the case 
 
“Cigarettes attract smokers, smugglers and thieves”,9 leading to the loss that was the object of the 
proceedings in BAT v Exel. Various members of the British American Tobacco Group (BAT), shipped tobacco 
products with the English freight forwarder Exel , who contracted as main contractor and primary carrier 
under a framework contract and a local agreement. Exel, as permitted by the contract, subcontracted to 
Esser and Kazemier and was thus neither involved in the physical movement of the goods nor in the issuing 
of the consignment note. Two consignments, one to be carried between Hungary and Denmark and the 
other between Switzerland and The Netherlands, ended with cargo loss. Part of the cargo of cigarettes of 
the shipment to Denmark was lost while the vehicle was parked overnight, contrary to instructions, in a 
carpark near Copenhagen. The cargo of tobacco of the cargo bound for the Netherlands was allegedly stolen 
en route in an armed robbery in Belgium. 
 
For each of the two consignments the actual road carriers had taken over the goods for transportation and 
issued a road consignment note as carrier. The members of the BAT group as cargo claimants sued both 
Exel, the primary contractual carrier, and Essers and Kazemier, the actual road carriers, in the English courts. 
The motivation to sue in England was high, due to a difference in assessment of damages, which in England 
includes duty because of the loss,10 in contrast to most continental jurisdictions, and notably the 
                                                                 
5 C-406/92 Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Tatry v Owners of the Maciej Rataj (The Tatry) [1994] ECR I-
5439; [1999] QB 515. 
6 Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG [2010] ILPr 35.  
7 Case C-452/12 Nipponkoa Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd v Inter-Zuid Transport BV [2014] ILPr 10. 
8 C-157/13 Nickel & Goeldner Spedition GmbH v “Kintra” UAB [2015] Q.B. 96, [2015] ILPr 1. 
9 BAT v Exel [2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, Lord Mance at [1]. 
10 According to the decision of the House of Lords in Buchanan & Co v Babco Forwarding and Shipping (UK) Ltd [1978] 
A.C. 141, art.23.4 CMR as “other charges incurred in respect of carriage” included excise duty which had to be paid by 
the claimant where the cargo of whisky bound for export was lost whilst sti l l within the jurisdiction. However contrast 
Sandeman Coprimar SA v Transitos y Transportes Integrales SL [2003] EWCA Civ 113; [2003] QB 1270, where damages 
for guarantee payments which the claimant had to make to tax authorities due to the loss of tax seals by the defendant 
carrier were held too remote. The broad interpretation of “other charges” in Buchanan, however, seems, by no means, 
to express a general standard throughout CMR states. See the discussion of the then CIM 1980, art 40.3 in the Bulletin 
of International Carriage by Rail  No.1/2004, Case Law (p .15) expressed in summary as: “’Other amounts incurred in 
connection with carriage of the lost goods’ within the meaning of Article 23 (4) of CMR and Article 40 § 3 of CIM only 
include such expenses as would also have been incurred to the same extent in ca rriage according to contract and 
which would have contributed to the value of the goods at the place of destination, i.e. which have not been incurred 
as the result of loss”(p.III). The text of CIM 1999, art.30.4, now explicitly excludes compensation of ex cise duties which 
only become due because of the loss; and see also CIM Explanatory Report art.30 paras 6 and 7 clearly differentiating 
between customs and excise duties. See insofar also the commentary in Clarke, International Carriage of Goods by 
Road: CMR (6th edn, Informa Law, 2014), para 98; Koller, Transportrecht, Kommentar, (7th edn, Verlag C H Beck, 2010) 
(hereafter Koller), CMR, art 23, para 10 and CIM, art.30 para 1; Schmidt, Czerwenka, Herber, Münchener Kommentar 
zum Handelsgesetzbuch, Band 7, §§ 407 - 475h Transportrecht (2nd edn, Verlag C H Beck, 2009) (hereafter MüKo 
HGB), CMR, art 23, paras 35, 37-38 (Jesser-Huß) and CIM, art 30, para 7 (Freise) and Thume, Kommentar CMR, 
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Netherlands where both road hauliers had their places of business. Duty paid amounted to approximately 
90% of the cost of the cigarettes. Exel accepted jurisdiction, having both, its place of business in England 
and having signed a jurisdiction agreement in favour of the English courts in its contracts with the 
consignors. However, Exel was not represented and played no part in the proceedings. Essers and Kazemier, 
in turn, contested jurisdiction of the English courts and the question arose whether jurisdiction could be 
validly founded over all defendants in England. 
 
The case history 
At first instance in 2012, in the High Court, Cooke J. declined jurisdiction against the actual road carriers 
and set aside the proceedings against them. On appeal, in a leading judgment by Sir Bernard Rix and with 
agreement of McFarlane LJ and Sir Timothy Lloyd, the Court of Appeal reached the opposite conclusion. 
The Supreme Court, with Lord Mance delivering the leading judgment and Lord Neuberger, Lord Clarke, 
Lord Sumption, Lord Reed in agreement, allowed the appeal and reinstated the order of Cooke J setting 
aside service of the proceedings against the actual road carriers for lack of jurisdiction. What were the 
reasons and what has been clarified by this lengthy trial over 3 instances?  
 
Common ground 
The parties had agreed on the following common ground, which was therefore to be the accepted basis of 
the case11: The two BAT companies as consignors were parties to the framework and/or local agreement 
with Exel which provided for English law and exclusive jurisdiction of the English courts. Further, the 
arrangement between the parties was a contract of carriage by Exel within the meaning of the CMR. In 
relation to the CMR and the provisions of its Chapter VI  the carriage was performed as carriage by 
successive carriers; Exel was the first carrier and Essers and Kazemier respectively the last carrier and also 
the performing carriers at the time of the loss under the CMR successive carrier provisions. 12  
 
Under Article 34 CMR successive carriage requires a movement of goods under a single contract of carriage, 
with the second carriers and each succeeding carrier becoming party to the contract of carriage under the 
terms of the consignment note by virtue of taking over the goods and the consignment note.13 However 
Exel never took over the goods or issued the consignment note. There is , however, support in the English 
courts that this does not deter from categorising this arrangement as successive carriage, as long as Exel is 
the primary contracting carrier and the sub-contractors take over the goods and issue the consignment 
note (also) on the primary carrier’s behalf.14 While the Supreme Court questioned whether this approach 
was in fact appropriate, it did not have to decide the matter.15 Instead, the question was whether the 
                                                                 
Übereinkommen über den Beförderungsvertrag im internationalen Straßengüterverkehr (3rd edn, Deutscher 
Fachverlag GmbH Fachmedien Recht und Wirtschaft, 2013), art 23, paras 34 -35 (Thume/Riemer). 
11 And equally not open to the court to debate or decide upon. 
12 See arts 34 and 35 CMR. 
13 Art 34: “If carriage governed by a single contract is performed by successive road carriers, each of them shall be 
responsible for the performance of the whole operation, the second carrier and each succeeding carrier becoming a 
party to the contract of carriage, under the terms of the consignment note, by reason of his acceptance of the goods 
and the consignment note.”  
14 See both Donaldson J and the Court of Appeal in Ulster-Swift Ltd v Taunton Meat Haulage Ltd [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep 
502, 507; [1977] 1 Lloyd's Rep 346 , 358–361 (the primary carrier does not have to carry itself to be deemed a 
successive carrier) and  in this context see also SGS-Ates Componenti Elettronici SpA v Grappo Ltd  [1978] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 
281 (QB), 284, Goff J (acceptance of the consignment note did not require physical acceptanc e, but could take place 
through the intermediary of a servant or agent) and Coggins T/A PC Transport v LKW Walter International 
Transportorganisation AG  [1999] Lloyd’s Rep 255 (CLCC (BL) = Central London County Court (Business List)) Hallgarten 
QC (to be successive carrier one has to have taken over the goods and the consignment note, although this could take 
place via an agent). See also discussion and critique in Clarke, International Carriage of Goods by Road: CMR, 3rd edn, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2014 (hereafter Clarke) at 50a ff, esp 50b. Further also note the recent decision of the Dutch 
Supreme Court in C&V Veldhuizen Holding B.V. v Beurskens Allround Cargo B.V. of 11. September 2015 (Case Nr. 
14/03211), NJB 2015/1635, S&S 2016/1, which seems to adopt the same approach in applying art 34 to the 
relationship between the merely contractual carrier and the actual (and sub-contracting) carrier. 
15 BAT v Exel [2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, Lord Mance at [12-13]. 
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consignors could found jurisdiction in England, not only against the main contractor Exel, but also against 
the sub-contractors as successive CMR carriers, by relying on Exel’s presence in England and the 
proceedings brought against it, and/or on the jurisdiction agreement in the main contract between the 
consignors and Exel. 
 
 
III. The Issues 
 
The particular questions to be decided on in the context of the case were framed by Lord Mance16 as 
follows:  
 
“(i)  First, can articles 31 and 36 be read together, so that, once a claimant has established 
jurisdiction against one defendant under article 31.1(a), it can then bring into that 
jurisdiction any other successive carrier potentially liable under article  36 ?  
 
(ii)  Second, is it under article 31 sufficient to enable the BAT companies to sue Essers and 
Kazemier as successive carriers in England that the English courts were designated by 
agreement in the carriage contracts made between such BAT companies and Exel?  
 
(iii)  Third, can the BAT companies sue Essers and Kazemier in the English courts, on the basis 
that “the branch or agency through which the contract of carriage was made” was in 
England?  
 
(iv)  Fourth, do the provisions or principles of the Brussels I Convention on Civil Jurisdiction 
and Judgments, Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction 
and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (OJ 
2001 L12, p 1) (“the Brussels Regulation”)  either enable jurisdiction to be established over 
Essers and Kazemier or inform or dictate the answer to any of the previous questions?” 
 
 
The issues in turn: 
 
1. Article 3617 as jurisdictional rule, in conjunction with 31.118? 
 
Once a claimant had established jurisdiction against one defendant under article 31.1(a), could it bring into 
that jurisdiction any other successive carrier potentially liable under article 36? That this was so was the 
argument of the cargo claimants which had been rejected at First Instance but accepted by the Court of 
Appeal, with reference to the structure of the CMR and obiter dicta from previous decisions.19 In the UK 
                                                                 
16 BAT v Exel [2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, Lord Mance at [15]. 
17 Art 36 CMR: “Except in the case of a counter-claim or a set-off raised in an action concerning a claim based on the 
same contract of carriage, legal proceedings in respect of l iability for loss, damage or delay may on ly be brought 
against the first carrier, the last carrier or the carrier who was performing that portion of the carriage during which 
the event causing the loss, damage or delay occurred; an action may be brought at the same time against several of 
these carriers.” 
18 Art 31.1 CMR: “In legal proceedings arising out of carriage under this Convention, the plaintiff may bring an action 
in any court or tribunal of a contracting country designated by agreement between the parties and, in addition, in the 
courts or tribunals of a country within whose territory 
(a) the defendant is ordinarily resident, or has his principal place of business, or the branch or agency through which 
the contract of carriage was made, or 
(b) the place where the goods were taken over by the carrier or the place designated for delivery is situated, 
and in no other courts or tribunals.“ 
19 See BAT v Exel [2013] EWCA Civ 1319 at [32 – 75, 99]. The Court of Appeal had drawn the following conclusions from 
the obiter dicta  in Cummins Engine Co Ltd v Davis Freight Forwarding (Hull) Ltd [1981] 1 W.L.R. 1363, [1981] 2 Lloyd's 
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Supreme Court Lord Mance, in his leading judgment, also referred to the structure of the CMR as a key 
consideration for the case and on this point, but adopted a very different approach to that taken by the 
Court of Appeal.20 Lord Mance suggested that the CMR had to be taken as a whole; it could not be separated 
into a series of sequential provisions.21 From this holistic investigation the following could be observed: 
 
Chapter V, containing article 31.1 and its jurisdictional rules, could not be read as only dealing with cargo 
interests and the original CMR carrier, but had to apply also to situations where successive carriers were 
involved. This could be observed from all other provisions in this same chapter, such as article 30 dealing 
with checking of goods and time limits for making reservations, article 32 dealing with the one-year 
limitation period for actions and also paragraphs (2)-(5) of article 31 dealing with matters of lis pendens, 
enforceability of judgments, and security for costs. A holistic perspective therefore also had to be contained 
in the jurisdictional rules of article 31.1, thus also covering cases of successive carriage.  
 
The relationship between articles 31.1, 36 and 39.2 was not one of jurisdiction. BAT’s submission that article 
36 as jurisdictional rule for claims by cargo interests to join successive carriers provided symmetry to the 
joinder provision in article 39.2, 2nd sentence, in respect of recourse claims between carriers was not 
acceptable. Instead, Lord Mance explained the significant differences in content and structure between 
articles 31.1 and 32.9 as follows:  
 
“(i) article 31.1 does not only offer a claimant the jurisdiction of any individual defendant's 
ordinary residence, principal place of business or branch or agency. It offers the 
additional advantage of jurisdiction against all carriers potentially liable under article 36 
(the first, the last and the performing carriers) in the place either of taking over or 
designated for delivery of the goods. No such jurisdiction is available under article 39.2 
to a carrier seeking recourse from another carrier.  
(ii) article 39.2 concerns recourse claims which fall under articles 37 and 38 to be divided 
pro rata, potentially between all carriers and not just the first, last or performing carrier. 
This is so, having regard to the specific provisions covering cases where more than one 
carrier was responsible for the loss or damage, or where it cannot be ascertained who 
was responsible or where a carrier otherwise liable to contribute is insolvent. There is 
an obvious imperative under article 39.2 to enable a claimant to bring all such claims in 
one jurisdiction. The same imperative does not exist under article 31.1, since cargo 
interests are under article 36 entitled to look to any one of the relevant carriers (first, 
last or performing) to meet their full claim, each being liable 100%. Further, in so far as 
cargo interests do wish to pursue all such relevant carriers together, they are able to do 
so in the place either of taking over or designated for delivery as stated in point (i).”22 
                                                                 
Rep. 402, (CA) and  ITT Schaub-Lorenz Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH v Birkart Johann Internationale Spedition GmbH & Co 
KG [1988] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 487, (CA): recourse claims between carriers could be heard at the same time as the main 
claim for compensation; that article 31.1(a) could be read as referring to several defendants and that articles 31.1 19 
with 34 and 36 meant that a cargo claimant could sue all  successive road carriers together in one proceeding at the 
place of domicile of one of the carriers. The structure of the CMR showed that while in article 31.1 jurisdiction was 
covered for claims between cargo interest and carriers, this did not cover successive carriers as they had yet to be 
introduced in the later article 34. As article 39.2 dealt with jurisdiction over recourse claims between successive 
carriers, the relevant chapter also ought to comprise rules on jurisdiction over successive carriers by cargo interests. 
In its view, this was indeed provided in Article 3619; alternatively, if this was not accepted, domestic law was to apply 
to fi l l  this gap. Article 36 showed that the carriers open to suit by cargo claimants could be sued at the same time and 
thus in the same court of one of the carriers. Here the primary contractual carrier Exel provided this l ink to the English 
courts. 
20 Which had only focused on article 31.1 and chapter VI on successive carriers; see n. 19 above.  
21 BAT v Exel [2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, Lord Mance at [19 - 20]. 
22 BAT v Exel [2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, Lord Mance at [37]. See also S Grignon-Dumoulin, “Forum 
shopping: Article 31 de la CMR”, (2006) 3 Univ L Rev 609, 613, applying a clear separation from art 31.1 and limitation 
of the jurisdictional grounds for suit between successive carriers under art 39.2. 
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According to the UK Supreme Court, the obiter dicta referred to by the cargo interests and accepted in the 
Court of Appeal were not convincing as they had been based on claims of a different nature.23 Articles 36 
in fine only clarified that several successive carriers could be sued together in one action, that is, their joint 
and several liability. A similar clarification could be found in the Warsaw Convention in articles 30.3, 2nd 
sentence. That there was a requirement of applying the jurisdictional provisions of article 31.1 to a carrier 
eligible to be sued under article 36 was also explained in literature as a practical curtailing of the severity 
of the joint and several liability as a successive carrier.24   
 
Therefore, jurisdiction over the actual carriers Essers and Kazemier could only be given if the provisions of 
article 31.1 were fulfilled with respect to themselves and not that of another carrier, even if all were 
considered successive carriers.  
 
 
2. Jurisdiction agreement? 
 
The cargo claimants argued that the terms of the contract with the primary carrier, including the jurisdiction 
clause, also bound the successive carriers, whether they had notice of all the clauses or not. The High Court 
and the Supreme Court both rejected this suggestion. While the Court of Appeal had not needed to decide 
the issue, it had opined that it was at least positively inclined towards such argumentation.  
 
The relevant part of article 31.1 provides: “In legal proceedings arising out of carriage under this 
Convention, the plaintiff may bring an action in any court or tribunal of a contracting country designated 
by agreement between the parties25 and, in addition, in the courts of tribunals of a country within whose 
territory …, and in no other courts or tribunals.“ 
 
The Supreme Court in its decision26 referred to the general principle that a contract is based on 
agreement,27 a principle that in respect to jurisdiction clauses was also enshrined in the CMR and the 
Brussels I Regime.28 The original contract contained such an agreement, but could it bind the successive 
carrier? The successive carrier, according to article 34, became party to the contract of carriage concluded 
between the original parties, but only “under the terms of the consignment note, by reason of his 
acceptance of the goods and the consignment note”. For clauses of the original contract, such as a 
jurisdiction agreement, to be valid against the successive carrier, notice had to be given to him, by inclusion 
in the consignment note. According to articles 4 and 9.1 of the CMR the consignment note confirmed the 
contract and was prima facie evidence of the making of the contract of carriage and its conditions. The 
consignment note also required a number of particulars set out in article 6, which by their nature disclosed 
the core terms of the main carriage contract. Article 6.3 and the relevant box on consignment notes entitled 
“Conventions particulières” or “Besondere Vereinbarungen” contemplated the addition of any other 
particulars the parties deemed useful, which would have allowed the inclusion of a jurisdiction agreement 
or any other instructions. If the parties wanted to bind successive carriers by such a clause or instructions 
they would have to include it within the consignment note, as required by article 34. 29 Thus, while the 
                                                                 
23 The obiter dicta had been recourse claims and the cases’ themes and parties’ interests therefore had been different. 
In particular, due to this different focus, the dicta had been made in passing without having necessitated any precise 
investigation of the respective issues and, of further importance was that the opinion expressed in the relevant dicta 
in Cummins had not been shared by all  the judges; see BAT v Exel [2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, Lord Mance 
at [38 -41]. 
24 BAT v Exel [2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, Lord Mance at [42]. 
25 Emphasis added. 
26 BAT v Exel [2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, Lord Mance at [17, 21-30], Lord Sumption at [65]. 
27 BAT v Exel [2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, Lord Mance at [26]. 
28 See art 31.1 CMR and arts 23.1 Br I Reg/art 25.1 Br I bis Reg. 
29 The contrary opinion expressed by Prof Loewe29 (that a jurisdiction clause would bind the successive carriers even 
without inclusion in the consignment note and that the successive carriers could sue the primary carrier if he had not 
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jurisdiction clause bound the original parties, it could not provide jurisdiction of the English courts against 
Essers and Kazemier. 
 
 
3. Branch or agency? 
 
On the submission that the primary carrier Exel was to be seen as acting as branch or agency through which 
the contract with the successive carriers was made, had been rejected by all courts. According to the UK 
Supreme Court, the reference in article 31.1(a) to “the branch or agency through which the contract of 
carriage was made” applied to the original parties to the contract of carriage, but not to any statutory 
parties who according to article 34 only became parties to the contract in consequence of their taking over 
the goods and the consignment note.30 
 
  
4. Brussels I overriding principles? 
 
a) The submissions 
 
The submissions of BAT in the context were as follows: The application of specialised conventions within 
the European Union were based on and subject to article 71.131 of the Brussels I Regulation,32 allowing pre-
existing conventions, such as the CMR, generally to be applied in priority to the Brussels I Regime. However 
according to C-406/92 The Tatry33 gaps left by the specialised convention were to be filled by the Brussels I 
Regime. Joinder of several defendants at the place of domicile of one of them was a principle of general 
international acceptance and was enshrined in article 6.1 of the Brussels I Regulation34 and also in a non-
Union context in domestic English civil procedure law35. Since a comparable provision was missing in the 
CMR the gap had to be filled via the Jurisdiction Regulation. Alternatively and according to Cases C-533/08 
TNT v AXA36 and C-452/12 Nipponkoa v Inter-Zuid37, if the CMR precluded the application of article 6.1 
Brussels I this would lead to results less favourable for achieving sound operation of the internal market 
compared to those of the Brussels I Regime which therefore had to be applied to uphold the principle 
underlying the Jurisdiction Regulation of minimising the risk of concurrent proceedings and that of 
irreconcilable judgments. Article 6.1 Brussels I was therefore paramount.  
 
Before engaging with the Supreme Court decision and providing further commentary on the issues, here 
firstly the prior EU case-law to which the courts referred. 
  
                                                                 
informed them of the clause; see Loewe, “Commentary on the Convention of 19 May 1956 on the Contract for the 
International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR)”, [1976] ETL 311, 399, [No. 282]) was unconvincing as it was made in 
“simple conclusionary terms”, without reference to the drafting history of the convention or other relevant 
explanations. Equally other scholars have not accepted Prof Loewe’s view on this point.  
30 BAT v Exel [2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, Lord Mance at [32], Lord Sumption at [66]. 
31 Article 71.1 states:  
“This Regulation shall not affect any conventions to which the Member States are parties and which in relation to 
particular matters, govern jurisdiction or the recognition or enforcement of judgments.” 
32 Hereafter also referred to as the “Jurisdiction Regulation” or as “Brussels I”. 
33 C-406/92 Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Tatry v Owners of the Maciej Rataj (The Tatry) [1994] ECR I-
5439; [1999] QB 515. 
34 Article 6.1 Brussels I provides:   
“A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued:  
1. where he is one of a number of defendants , in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided 
the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.” 
35 See Practice Direction 6B para 3.1 (3) Civil  Procedure Rules 1998. 
36 Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG [2010] ILPr 35.  
37 Case C-452/12 Nipponkoa Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd v Inter-Zuid Transport BV [2014] ILPr 10. 
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b) Prior case-law of the ECJ in more detail 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union38 had qualified the principle that specialised conventions take 
precedence over the Brussels I Regime39 in several decisions.   
 
The Tatry  
The landmark decision was Case C-406/92 The Tatry40 and at its core dealt with questions on lis pendens 
and related actions. It concerned actions in personam and in rem. An action for declaration of non-liability 
and limitation of liability was brought by shipowners on the one hand; on the other, the vessel was arrested 
and claims for damages due to contamination of the cargo brought by various groups of cargo owners. 
Jurisdiction in rem was based on the International Convention Relating to the Arrest of Sea-Going Ships of 
1952.41 The ECJ decided firstly that gaps in a specialised Convention, although generally taking priority, 
could be filled by reference to the Brussels Convention.42 The Arrest Convention contained no rules on lis 
pendens or related actions and since the specialised Convention therefore left a gap the relevant rules of 
the Brussels Convention were applicable. Further the court decided what was to be interpreted as the same 
cause of action for the purpose of the lis pendens rule.43 It was to be seen broadly and included a matter 
where, between the same parties, one claim was for damages and the other for a declarat ion of non-
liability.  
 
TNT v AXA 
In TNT v AXA44 a German court had accepted jurisdiction over a liability claim, even though the carrier had 
already sought a declaration of non-liability in the Netherlands. This caused problems when enforcement 
of the decision was sought in the Dutch courts. According to the interpretation of the CMR in the 
Netherlands, the German court had failed to apply the lis pendens rule of article 31.2 CMR and thus had 
never had jurisdiction, notwithstanding that German law preferred a narrow interpretation of lis pendens.45 
The question thus arose whether the Dutch courts could review jurisdiction of the court of origin in 
enforcement proceedings under article 31.3 CMR or, whether instead the rules of the stricter Brussels I 
Regulation prohibiting such review,46 applied.  
 
The Court of Justice, interpreting article 71 Brussels I, pointed out that while the specialised convention 
rules would be applied in respect of jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments, for intra-EU cases this 
needed to be done in the light of the standards provided for by the Jurisdiction Regulation. The fact that a 
convention was concluded with states within and outside of the EU did not change this. If the dispute was 
one between courts of Member States of the European Union the principles which underlay judicial co-
operation in civil and commercial matters in the European Union could not be compromised. These were, 
in particular, the principles recalled in recitals 6, 11, 12 and 15 – 17 of the Preamble of the Regulation “of 
free movement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, predictability as to the courts having 
jurisdiction and therefore legal certainty for litigants, sound administration of justice, minimisation of risk 
of concurrent proceedings, and mutual trust in the administration of justice in the European Union”. 47 
                                                                 
38 Hereafter CJEU; formerly called European Court of Justice (hereafter ECJ). 
39 According to the former art 57 BC; since 1 March 2002 by virtue of art 71 Br I Reg, and as  of 10 January 2015 by 
virtue of art 71 Br I bis. See insofar on the priority of art 31 CMR: MüKo HGB, CMR, art 31, paras 9-14 (Jesser-Huß); 
Thume, art 31, paras 13 & 38 (Demuth) and Koller, CMR, art 31, para 1. 
40 C-406/92 Owners of Cargo Lately Laden on Board the Tatry v Owners of the Maciej Rataj (The Tatry) [1994] ECR I-
5439; [1999] QB 515. 
41 Hereafter Arrest Convention 1952. 
42 And now the relevant instrument of the Brussels I regime. 
43 See art 21BC, which became art 27 Br I Reg, and see now Br I bis, arts 29 and 31. 
44 Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG [2010] ILPr 35.  
45 On this point see further the discussion below of Case C-452/12 Nipponkoa Insurance v Inter-Zuid Transport. 
46 Br I Reg, arts 41, 43 with 35.3. 
47 Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG [2010] ILPr 35, [49]. 
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The CJEU stated further:  
“Article 71 of Regulation No 44/2001 cannot have a purport that conflicts with the principles 
underlying the legislation of which it is part. Accordingly, that article cannot be interpreted as 
meaning that, in a field covered by the regulation, such as the carriage of goods by road, a 
specialised convention, such as the CMR, may lead to results which are less favourable for 
achieving sound operation of the internal market than the results to which the regulation’s 
provisions lead.”48 
  
After citing previous case law on some of the principles stated, the CJEU decided that article 71 
Brussels I “must be interpreted as meaning that, in a case such as the main proceedings, the 
rules governing jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement that are laid down by a convention on 
a particular matter, such as the lis pendens rule set out in article 31.2 of the [CMR], and the rule 
relating to enforceability set out in article 31.3 of that convention, apply provided that they are 
highly predictable, facilitate the sound administration of justice and enable the risk of 
concurrent proceedings to be minimised and that they ensure, under conditions at least as 
favourable as those provided for by the regulation, the free movement of judgments in civil and 
commercial matters and mutual trust in the administration of justice in the European Union 
(favor executionis).”49  
 
In effect, therefore, the decision means that EU Member States, amongst each other, cannot re-examine 
jurisdiction of the court of origin, irrespective of whether the recognition and enforcement rules are those 
of the EU or of a specialised convention. Indeed, the approach to use EU rules and principles for recognition 
and enforcement between EU Member States is now also clarified by the amended version of article 71.2(b) 
the Brussels I bis Regulation. The article clarifies specifically for recognition and enforcement that the 
provisions of the Regulation may be applied in any event, even where the conditions for recognition and 
enforcement of the specialised convention are to apply.50 This, therefore, ought to ensure an EU compatible 
approach amongst EU Member States inter se.  
 
Nipponkoa v Inter-Zuid  
Case C-452/12 Nipponkoa Insurance v Inter-Zuid Transport51 involved again the issue of lis pendens between 
negative declaratory relief obtained by a carrier and a later positive action for indemnity by the insurer of 
the primary carrier who had paid damages to the cargo claimant. According to the case-law of the German 
Bundesgerichtshof (BGH)52 the CMR had to be interpreted autonomously with the result that an action for 
negative declaratory relief and an action for indemnity were not treated as the same cause of action; in 
contrast to the European case-law under the Brussels I Regulation. The German court of first instance seized 
with the indemnity claim sought guidance from the CJEU as to whether the importation of the CMR, into 
the Brussels I Regime by virtue of article 71 of the Brussels I Regulation meant that it had to ensure 
conformity with EU principles when interpreting the rules of the CMR on jurisdiction and lis pendens.53 This, 
the CJEU confirmed: It referred to its comments in TNT v AXA54 where it had held that article 71 precluded 
an interpretation of an international convention in a manner which failed to ensure, under conditions at 
least as favourable as those provided for by the Brussels I Regulation, that the underlying objectives and 
principles of the Regulation were observed. But, this time, the court did not stop here. It decided, more 
specifically, that article 71.1 precluded an interpretation of the CMR lis pendens rules in article 31.2 which 
                                                                 
48 Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG [2010] ILPr 35, [51]. 
49 Case C-533/08 TNT Express Nederland BV v AXA Versicherung AG [2010] ILPr 35, [55]. 
50 This goes beyond the wording of the current Br I Reg, art 71.2(b), which only refers to the application of the 
provisions of the Regulation which concern the procedure for recognition and enforcement alongside the conditions 
of the specialised convention. 
51 Case C-452/12 Nipponkoa Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd v Inter-Zuid Transport BV [2014] ILPr 10. 
52 The German Supreme Court; see judgments of 20 th November 2003, case numbers I ZR 102/02 and I ZR 294/02. 
53 CMR, arts 31.1 and 31.2. 
54 In particular at [49, 51 and 55]; as set out above under TNT v AXA. 
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resulted in an action for negative declaration or a negative declaratory judgment in one Member State not 
being classed as having the same cause of action as an action for indemnity between the same parties in 
another Member State.55 
 
All in all, this decision clarified the required intra-EU understanding of lis pendens, but also that preliminary 
rulings could be sought on the interpretation of a specialised convention in its interaction with the Brussels 
I Regime via article 71.1. 
  
 
c) The UK Supreme Court on joinder and European principles 
 
The Supreme Court first discussed the desirability to join all defendants in one forum and considered firstly 
whether there was a gap that needed filling, possibly by means of an expansive construction of the CMR 
provisions, before subsequently analysing whether, based on EU law, article 6.1 of Brussels I would prevail 
over article 31.1 of the CMR.   
 
Necessity of an expansive construction of the CMR jurisdictional rules to allow joinder? 
While there clearly was an interest to be able to sue several carriers in the same forum and such interest 
was enshrined in European56 and domestic rules57, the approach in achieving this aim invariably did not 
have to be the same, Lord Mance stated. The European and English domestic rules focused on domicile 
jurisdiction as pivotal factor. Yet, the approach in the Warsaw Convention was different, as was the one in 
the CMR. Indeed, the aim of joining all defendants was provided for in Article 31.1(b) CMR58 where all 
carriers could be sued either at the place where the goods had been taken over or at  the place designated 
for delivery.59 That this may not be in the jurisdiction preferred by the claimant could not lead to the 
construction of other, for the claimant more favourable, rules of jurisdiction: article 31.1 clearly provided 
“and in no other courts or tribunals”. Compared to the Warsaw Convention which provided only for the 
place of destination, the CMR provided for additional fora. The CMR overall provided a balanced and 
comprehensive regime on jurisdiction. While the CMR had several jurisdictional rules that paralleled the 
Brussels I jurisdiction regulation, there were also several differences, such as the rules on joining several 
defendants. That this was so had to be accepted and did not constitute a gap simply because a rule similar 
to article 6.1 of the Brussels I Regulation, to allow suit of several defendants together at the place of one’s 
domicile, was not available.  
 
Overall, there was no gap and thus no need to expand the interpretation of the CMR provisions by the 
desirability to join defendants according to the rules and approaches taken in other regimes.60  
 
Article 6.1 Brussels I enshrining an overriding principle? 
On the question whether article 6.1 Brussels I Regulation or the principle behind it 61 prevailed over article 
31.1 of the CMR, the Supreme Court, first of all, referred back to the EU Treaties and recalled the wording 
of, what is now, article 351 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 62 highlighting 
                                                                 
55 Case C-452/12 Nipponkoa Insurance Co (Europe) Ltd v Inter-Zuid Transport BV [2014] ILPr 10 [36–38]. 
56 Art 6.1 Brussels I Reg and art 8.1 Brussels I bis Reg. 
57 In English procedural law, see Practice Direction 6B para 3.1(1) to the Civil  Procedure Rules 1998. 
58 And see the solution in Art 28.1 in fine Warsaw Convention: “the court having jurisdiction at the place of 
destination”.  
59 BAT v Exel [2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, Lord Mance at [31, 37, 45]. 
60 BAT v Exel [2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, Lord Mance at [43-47]. 
61 BAT v Exel [2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, Lord Mance in his leading judgment at [48 – 58] with whom Lord 
Neuberger, Lord Sumption and Lord Reed agreed. 
62 Art 351 TFEU: 
1) “The rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 January 1958 or, for acceding States, 
before the date of their accession, between one or more Member States on the one hand, and one or more 
third countries on the other, shall  not be affected by the provisions of the Treaties. 
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that pre-existing agreements, such as the CMR, should not be affected by EU law and even by the Treaties 
themselves. This principle had also found entry to the Brussels I Regime by article 71. 63 Although the 
position established was clear, the CJEU had interpreted it in the Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P 
Kadi v Council of the European Union.64 The CJEU had decided that while the primacy of international 
obligations allowed derogations even from primary EU law, the EU provisions foreseeing this could not be 
understood as authorising any challenge to the principles that formed the very foundation of the 
Community legal order and, as such, the protection of fundamental rights including the review by the 
Community judicature of the lawfulness of measures taken and their consistency with such fundamental 
rights. Kadi was a decision at a high level of importance for individual freedoms, and it was surprising that 
the thinking was applied to the “tarmacadam of the world’s roads”. 65 Yet, in TNT and Nipponkoa the 
European Court had suggested that a specialised convention had to lead to results which were as favourable 
for achieving sound operation of the internal market as that of the Brussels I Regulation, in reasoning that 
was essentially circular. The European Court had done so without referring to any relevant Treaty 
provisions. These however enshrined the purpose of allowing derogations even from the Treaties 
themselves, a position that had been highlighted extra-judicially also by Judge Rosas,66 and pre-existing 
case-law of the CJEU67.68  
 
While at a high level the preservation of the internal market was of course fundamental to the EU and the 
CJEU in TNT and Nipponkoa had gone further and elevated the principles which underlay judicial 
                                                                 
2) To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with the Treaties, the Member State or States 
concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibilities established. Member States shall, 
where necessary, assist each other to this end and shall, where appropriate, adopt a common attitude. 
3) In applying the agreements referred to in the first paragraph, Member States shall take into account the fact 
that the advantages accorded under the Treaties by each Member State form an integral part of the 
establishment of the Union and are thereby inseparably l inked with the creation of common institutions, the 
conferring of powers upon them and the granting of the same advantages by all  the other Member States.” 
63 Article 71 states:   
“1. This Regulation shall not affect any conventions to which the Member States are parties and which in relation to 
particular matters, govern jurisdiction or the recogniti on or enforcement of judgments.  
2. With a view to its uniform interpretation, paragraph 1 shall be applied in the following manner:  
(a) this Regulation shall not prevent a court of a member state, which is a party to a convention on a particular 
matter, from assuming jurisdiction in accordance with that convention, even where the defendant is domiciled 
in another member state which is not a party to that convention. The court hearing the action shall, in any event, 
apply article 26 of this Regulation;  
(b) judgments given in a member state by a court in the exercise of jurisdiction provided  for in a convention on a 
particular matter shall  be recognised and enforced in the other member states in accordance with this 
Regulation. 
Where a convention on a particular matter to which both the member state of origin and the member state 
addressed are parties lays down conditions for the recognition or enforcement of judgments, those conditions 
shall apply. In any event, the provisions of this Regulation which concern the procedure for recognition and 
enforcement of judgments may be applied.” 
64 Joined Cases C-402/05P and C-415/05P Kadi v Council of the European Union [2008] ECR I-6351, [2009] AC 1225. 
65 BAT v Exel [2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, Lord Mance at [51]. 
66 Who had not been a member of the CJEU in TNT or Nipponkoa ; see Allan Rosas, “The Status in EU Law of 
International Agreements Concluded by EU Member States”, Fordham International Law Journal (Vol 34, Issue 5 
(2011) article 7) 1304, 1321, with references to authorities inter alia including C-812/79 Attorney-General v Juan 
Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787; [1981] 2 CMLR 193, at [8]: „ As the Court has already held in its judgment of 27 February 
1962 in Case 10/61 EC Commission v Italy, the purpose of [Art 351 TFEU] is to lay down, in accordance with the 
principles of international law, that the application of the Treaty does not affect the duty of the member -Sta te 
concerned to respect the rights of non-member countries under a prior agreement and to perform its obligations 
thereunder..“   
67 See C-812/79 Attorney-General v Juan Burgoa [1980] ECR 2787, [1981] 2 CMLR 193, and Case 10/61 EC Commission 
v Italy [1962] ECR 1, [1962] CMLR 187. 
68 BAT v Exel [2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, Lord Mance at [48-52]. 
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cooperation in civil and commercial matters as necessary for the sound operation of the internal market,69 
the context in which the rulings and these statements had been made was important. Both cases had dealt 
with competing proceedings between the same parties in different member states. Both had concerned 
free movement of judgments and mutual trust in the administration of justice and could be seen only to 
oust review of jurisdiction of another Member State’s courts in TNT and, in Nipponkoa, to import the 
understanding concerning lis pendens under the Regulation and overriding that of the CMR.70 
 
The case at hand in BAT, however, did not concern or present the risk of competing judgments involving 
the same parties, as BAT could sue Exel under the CMR for the whole of any loss. If BAT wanted to expand 
their target to pursue other defendants, they could do so in separate proceedings and could even join all 
together, although possibly not in a jurisdiction most favourably to its position. Any evidential advantages 
and aims of the claimants to sue and join the defendants in one rather than another jurisdiction, could not 
be associated with any fundamental propose of Union law in the field of jurisdiction or justice.  
 
In any event, the CMR represented a balanced jurisdictional regime which was adopted across some 55 
states, only half of which were EU Member States, which did not impinge on any of the principles the CJEU 
suggested had to be applied. Surely EU law would also allow bearing in mind the interests of third party 
states in a regime which operated with a certain degree of consistency across all contracting states. Thus, 
Lord Mance cautioned to confine overriding interests of Union law relatively narrowly. Restrictions under 
Union law on the ordinary application of an international convention would potentially undermine the 
uniformity and predictability which was the very aim of such conventions.  
 
The rules of jurisdiction of the CMR could therefore not be supplemented or overridden by the joinder rules 
of the Brussels I Regulation.  
 
 
IV. Comment 
 
The decision of the Supreme Court has re-established the status quo under the CMR and its interaction with 
the Brussels Regulation in the UK, which, for a while, had been called into question due to the decision and 
obiter dicta of the Court of Appeal in the same case. It is a welcome decision, emphasising the jurisdictional 
solutions as enshrined in the CMR in its article 31 without adding layers of understanding artificially 
imported from different regimes, such as domestic law and the EU judgments regulation.  
 
The Supreme Court summarised the (only) jurisdictional provisions available between cargo and carriers, 
which are contained in article 31.1 insofar:  
 
“(i)  a provision enabling the enforcement of any jurisdiction clause in favour of the court or 
tribunal of a contracting state which was (a) agreed between the parties to the original 
carriage contract, or (b) to be taken, in the light of article 34 , to be agreed as between the 
original goods interests and any successive carrier becoming party to that original contract  
on terms in the consignment note incorporating the jurisdiction clause, or (d)  [sic] agreed 
in some other way between the parties to the litigation;  
(ii)  provisions in paragraph (a) regarding ordinary residence and a principal place of business 
which can be relied on as against any carrier or successive carrier liable to suit under article 
36, as well as by a carrier bringing proceedings arising out of carriage under CMR against a 
consignor or consignee;  
(iii)  a further provision in paragraph (a) which can only sensibly apply in proceedings between 
original parties to the carriage contract; 71 and  
                                                                 
69 As cited above in text to n.47, citing TNT at [49]. 
70 BAT v Exel [2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, Lord Mance at [53-55]. 
71 Referring to “branch or agency through which the contract of carriage was made”.  
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(iv)  further provisions in paragraph (b) which open up jurisdiction in any claim arising out of 
CMR carriage to cover the courts or tribunals of the place of taking over or designated for 
delivery of the goods.  
The important corollary of these provisions is that, under the final words of article 31.1, a 
claimant may not bring an action arising out of carriage under CMR in any other courts or 
tribunals.”72 
 
Further, the decision gives thought and consideration to the interaction of specialised conventions with the 
Brussels I regime at the level of jurisdictional norms. Insofar however, a few further considerations may be 
appropriate. 
 
The CJEU case-law, as cited above, had, so far, not dealt with questions of direct or positive, initial 
jurisdiction and thus the potential interaction of rules founding jurisdiction between a specialised 
convention and the Brussels I Regulation, as argued in BAT. The CJEU decisions had only covered questions 
arising at a later, “second or negative” stage of proceedings: at the secondary jurisdictional stage of lis 
pendens, that of querying whether proceedings (for which jurisdiction had been assumed) had to be stayed, 
in order to avoid irreconcilable judgments (The Tatry and Nipponkoa); or at enforcement stage, by abiding 
to the principle of mutual trust, with the consequence of avoiding to review jurisdiction of the court of 
origin (TNT). This seemed to suggest that jurisdiction as a first (and positive) step was left to the specialised 
convention as its domain. However, in the meantime, the CJEU had occasion to discuss the appropriateness 
of applying CMR jurisdictional rules over those of the Brussels I Regulation: 
 
Nickel & Goeldner Spedition GmbH v “Kintra” UAB  
In Nickel & Goeldner Spedition GmbH v “Kintra” UAB73 the question was put before the court whether the 
divergence in jurisdictional rules between the Brussels I Regulation and the CMR would be cause for 
concern. The CJEU answered in the negative. It confirmed that, in principle, the jurisdictional rules of a 
specialised convention ousted those of the Brussels I Regulation and that, in particular, the CMR jurisdiction 
rules did not compromise the principles which underlay judicial co-operation in civil and commercial 
matters in the EU; in particular, article 31.1 CMR fulfilled the objective of legal certainty and therefore could 
be applied. So far, so good. In its reasoning, however, the court entered into a detailed comparison of the 
jurisdictional provisions and set out:  
 
“It is true that the second indent of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation No 44/2001, the wording of 
which refers to only one place of performance, offers the claimant less choice than Article 
31(1) of the CMR, which allows him to choose between the place where the goods were taken 
over by the carrier and the place designated for delivery of the goods. However, that fact is 
not such as to affect the compatibility of Article 31(1) of the CMR with principles which underlie 
judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters in the EU. The Court has accepted in 
relation to contracts for carriage that, in certain circumstances, the applicant may have the 
choice between the courts of the place of departure and those of the place of arrival. In that 
respect, it has stated that such a choice granted to the applicant, apart from respecting the 
criterion of proximity, also satisfied the requirement of predictability, in so far as it allowed 
the applicant, as well as the defendant, easily to identify the courts before which proceedings 
might be brought. What was more, it was consistent with the objective of legal certainty, since 
the applicant’s choice was limited to two possible judicial fora within the framework of the 
second indent of Article 5(1)(b) of Regulation No 44/2001, as set out in its previous case-law 
in C-204/08) Rehder v Air Baltic Corpn [2009] ECR I-6073).”74 
                                                                 
72 BAT v Exel [2015] UKSC 65; [2015] 3 W.L.R. 1173, Lord Mance at [33]. 
73 C-157/13 Nickel & Goeldner Spedition GmbH v “Kintra” UAB [2015] Q.B. 96, [2015] ILPr 1. 
74 C-157/13 Nickel & Goeldner Spedition GmbH v “Kintra” UAB [2015] Q.B. 96, [2015] ILPr 1 [41]. See also Collins & J. 
Harris, Dicey, Morris and Collins on the Conflict of Laws, (2nd Cumulative Supplement to the 15th ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 
2015) at 15-026. 
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The tenor of the decision is welcome in that it clarifies that the jurisdictional rules of the CMR are to be 
applied and are compatible with the EU principles underlying judicial co-operation in this area. It also 
clarifies that a choice for the claimant between different possible fora based on particular grounds is fully 
appropriate.  
 
Legal uncertainty by means of detailed evaluation of the regimes? 
However, the question is why the CJEU embarked on its detailed analysis of the CMR provisions and their 
comparability with the Brussels I Regime, as set out above, and whether it was indeed necessary. Was this 
simply to show that such convention rules are compatible with EU principles or was the aim to assert that 
even rules of jurisdiction should be examined on compatibility in each case? In the case of the comparison 
of the CMR with the EU Jurisdiction Regulation, the interpretation by the CJEU of article 5.1(b) of Brussels I 
had already lead to a similar interpretation to the solution enshrined in article 31.1(b) CMR.75 What would 
be the CJEU’s conclusion if the fora of the regimes to be compared were differing more significantly? For 
example, in the Warsaw and Montreal Conventions76 the fora are more restricted: the forum comparable 
to the Brussels I “place of performance” is limited to the place of destination and prorogation is not possible. 
Does it matter that jurisdiction agreements, where acceptable by the various transport conventions,77 can 
merely act as additional fora but are not exclusive, in contrast to the status quo under the jurisdiction 
regulation?78  
 
Non-exclusive jurisdiction agreements and the new Brussles I lis pendens rule 
The effects may be compounded by the new lis pendens rule in the Brussels I bis Regulation,79 which gives 
the court exclusively designated by the parties priority to decide the validity of the jurisdiction agreement. 80 
A question in the current context may thus be whether the new lis pendens rule enshrines a principle 
underlying judicial co-operation in civil and commercial matters and whether it thus might provide another 
                                                                 
75 And see also art 46.1 CIM, similarly to the CMR providing for jurisdiction at the place of taking over of the goods and 
the place designated for delivery; and art 21.1 (c) HambR at the port of loading or port of discharge; and art 66 (a) (ii) 
to (iv) RR at the place of receipt or the place of delivery, both as agreed in the contract of carriage, or the port of initi al 
loading or of final discharge from a ship; and see also art 71 RR for rules on consolidation of actions against the carrier 
and a maritime performing party. 
76 Arts 33 Montreal Convention and 28 Warsaw Convention; assuming that they would fall  within the scope of article 
71  Brussels I as pre-existing Convenitons, see also C. E. Tuo, L. Carpaneto, “Connections and Disconnections between 
Brussels I Regulation and International Conventions on Transport Matters”, Zhornik PFZ, 66 (2 -3) (2016) 141, 160.  
77 See art 21 HambR, ch 14 RR (apart from jurisdiction agreements after the damaging event or ones under volume 
contracts provided certain requirements are met); art 31 CMR; art 46 CIM; and without scope for a jurisdiction 
agreement altogether: art 33 MC and art 28 WC. 
78 Art 25.1, 2nd sentence, Br I Reg.  
79 See art 31.2 with art 25 Br I bis Reg.  
80 However, before the first seised (non-designated) court must stay its proceedings, the court designated by 
agreement must be seised and the court fist seised should at least be satisfied that there is a prima facie case that 
such an exclusive jurisdiction agreement exists  (see I. Bergson, “The death of torpedo actions? The practical operation 
of the Recast’s reforms to enhance the protection for exclusive jurisdiction agreements within the European Union”, 
[2015] J Priv Int Law 1, 6ff. and T Domej, “Die Neufassung der EuGVVO; Quantensprünge im europäischen 
Zivilprozessrecht“, 78 (2014) RabelsZ 508, 535f.). This may also entail  the question of whether the jurisdiction 
agreement is exclusive or not (see also A. Briggs, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments, (6th edn, Informa 2015) at 2.277 and 
I. Bergson, “The death of torpedo actions? The practical operation of the Recast’s reforms to enhance the protection 
for exclusive jurisdiction agreements within the European Union”, [2015] J Priv Int Law 1, 21); and the questions on 
how, on the basis of which rules, this existence and validity is determined is not straightforward  (see art 25.1 and 
Recital (20) of Br I and see discussion in Q Forner-Delaygua, „Changes to jurisdiction based on exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements under the Brussels I Regulation Recast“, [2015] J Priv Int Law 379, 394ff.; I. Bergson, “The death of torpedo 
actions? The practical operation of the Recast’s reforms to enhance the protection for exclusive jurisdiction 
agreements within the European Union”, [2015] J Priv Int Law 1, 12f. and T Domej, “Die Neufassung der EuGVVO; 
Quantensprünge im europäischen Zivilprozessrecht“, 78 (2014) RabelsZ 508, 526f.) . 
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inroad into the application of the rules of transport conventions. 81 However, this appears rather 
questionable as the new rule is an exception to a principle of the general “first come - first served” rule. 
Further and since the rule still needs to be tested and consolidated in its application by the CJEU, as it 
currently offers many issues of uncertainty82 and the potential for parallel proceedings,83 its elevation to an 
overriding principle seems, at least at this stage, difficult to justify. In any event, where a matter falls 
squarely into the scope of a specialised transport convention, jurisdiction agreements can only be non-
exclusive84 and clauses providing for exclusivity are likely to be deemed null and void,85 even on a precursory 
prima facie review by a court first seized. However, where the carriage is multimodal or the contract a 
freight forwarding contract, this issue of validity of a forum clause will be more difficult to determine as 
different views on the applicability and the scope of the various conventions exist. 86 
 
Whether a jurisdiction agreement is exclusive or additional to other grounds of jurisdiction, it is submitted, 
does not impede predictability and certainty for litigants; both are envisaged in Brussels I although 
exclusivity is seen as the norm.87 What is more, non-exclusivity is designed to fulfil another important EU 
principle which can be observed also in the EU jurisdictional framework: that of safeguarding the perceived 
weaker party from being forced to exclusively submit to a potentially detrimental jurisdiction.88 Indeed the 
decision to allow only additional fora to be agreed is a deliberate statement of the drafters of specialised 
transport conventions, retaining a wide range of choices for the claimant. This solution, in turn, may 
encourage performance of services to a higher standard, particularly because suit in a pre-selected forum 
cannot be ensured and duties may thus be tested against a wider number of legal frameworks; even more 
so in areas where performance duties and mandatory rules have been interpreted differently across the 
contracting states.89 Certainty for litigants is not created by a single rule but is the matter of provisions of a 
convention on jurisdiction as a whole.  
 
Joinder of parties – the issue in BAT v Exel 
Equally, the matter of joinder of several defendants should be decided, bearing the overall framework in 
mind. While the Brussels I Regime allows for joinder of several defendants at the place of the domicile of 
one of them,90 Brussels I does not necessarily emphasise the connecting factor of domicile as a jurisdictional 
                                                                 
81 As argued by W. Verheyen, “Forum clauses in carriage contracts after the Brussels I (bis) Regulation: procedural 
(un)certainty?” (2015) 21 JIML 23, 36 and A. Spijker, “Revised Brussels I regulation offers opportunities for CMR 
carriers”, ILO, 3rd February 2015, at https://www.akd.nl/Downloads/PublicatiesPDF/1760445_2015-02-
03_aspijker_ilo.pdf (last accessed 12.08.2016).  
82 See above n.81. 
83 See Q Forner-Delaygua, „Changes to jurisdiction based on exclusive jurisdiction agreements under the Brussels I 
Regulation Recast“, [2015] J Priv Int Law 379, 386ff.; I. Bergson, “The death of torpedo actions? The practical operation 
of the Recast’s reforms to enhance the protection for exclusive jurisdiction agreements within the European Union”, 
[2015] J Priv Int Law 1, 6ff. and see T Domej, “Die Neufassung der EuGVVO; Quantenspr ünge im europäischen 
Zivilprozessrecht“, 78 (2014) RabelsZ 508, 533f. 
84 Apart from certain specific volume contracts or agreements after the event under the Rotterdam Rules, arts 67 and 
72 RR.  
85 Art 41 CMR; art 5 CIM; art 49 MC and art 32 WC, art 79 RR and art 23.1 HambR. 
86 See for example M Hoeks, Multimodal transport law: the law applicable to the multimodal contract for the carriage 
of goods, (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business; 2010) and W. Verheyen, “Forum clauses in carriage contracts after the 
Brussels I (bis) Regulation: procedural (un)certainty?” (2015) 21  JIML 23, 27ff.  
87 See Art 25.1, 2nd sentence, Br I Reg, stating that unless otherwise designated, the jurisdiction agreement is taken to 
be exclusive. 
88 See e.g. Arts 13, 17 and 21 Br I and Arts 15, 19 and 23 Br I bis Reg for rules limiting prorogation in insurance, consumer 
and employment contracts. 
89 See also Simone Lamont-Black, Third Party Rights and Transport Documents under the DCFR – a potential for an 
appropriate and effective EUU unification and an improvement for the UK? , (2015) 21 JIML 280, 294. 
90 In art 6.1 Br I and art 8.1 Br I bis Reg. They provi de:  
“A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued: 1. where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts 
for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to 
DRAFT 
16 
 
rule trumping others. Rather it seems to represent a general rule in a broad regime which covers many 
different matters. In such a broad context, the domicile rule seems to be the most appropriate and 
applicable common connecting factor. However, this is different for the narrowly tailored transport 
conventions which have more specific foci. Equally, the Brussels I Regime allows for suit in alternative 
jurisdictions to the place of domicile at other relevant places, such as the place of performance of the 
contract.91 Exactly this latter connecting factor is the one that the CMR convention enshrines as the 
(possible) place for joinder, which ensures connection to the contractually agreed transportation. That it 
should pertain to an infringement of EU principles underlying the civil and commercial co-operation when 
parties are referred to this rule instead of the domicile rule seems difficult to fathom, as connecting factors 
are specifically chosen for their closeness with the particular subject matter. While domicile jurisdiction 
therefore seems particularly apt for a general jurisdiction regime, a more tailored regime to suit the 
emphasis of the contract envisaged, as in article 31.1(b) of the CMR, and as indeed in other transport 
conventions,92 seems highly appropriate.  
 
Where the CMR rules, allowing for multiple defendants, do not provide an option for the preferred forum, 
it is not open to the claimant to import the rules of the Brussels I Regime instead, to suit its forum shopping 
tactics. To do so, would mean to override the express jurisdictional rules (that is intentionally limiting the 
parties who, and the places where, they can be sued) in favour of an altogether different regime, which 
would erode the specialised convention and lead to what would be tantamount to dis-applying the 
jurisdictional rules of specialised conventions for intra-EU matters altogether, which would ignore the 
subject specific value judgments. That such choices are important is however also accepted within the EU 
by virtue of EU Regulations such as the proposal on jurisdiction matters of matrimonial property regimes93 
and the Brussel II Regime.94  
 
Past experience also suggests that the CJEU does not perceive the minimising of risks of irreconcilable 
judgments above and beyond other principles. In particular, in Case C-159/02 Turner v Grovit,95 by 
emphasising the overriding nature of the principle of mutual trust, the CJEU clearly dismissed the 
arguments of the House of Lords aimed to justify the use of anti-suit injunctions with the very 
considerations of avoiding irreconcilable judgments. Equally, that the Brussels I Regime itself allows for a 
multitude of fora seems to suggest that the minimising of risks of irreconcilable judgments is but one of 
several principles to consider. The Court of Justice in Case C-68/93 Shevill v Presse Alliance SA stated in the 
context of jurisdiction based on article 5(3) at the place where the harmful event occurred, that although 
there were admittedly disadvantages to having different court’s ruling on various aspects of the same 
dispute, this had to be accepted and in any event, the plaintiff always had the option of bringing his entire 
claim before one, albeit another, court. 96  
 
Indeed, as already pointed out, to choose a jurisdiction where all defendants can be sued together in one 
forum is available under the CMR. Thus, the need to avoid concurrent proceedings and the risk of 
irreconcilable judgments must be balanced in particular against the predictability of jurisdictional rules and 
legal certainty for litigants. The attainment of the latter principles would certainly not be helped by courts, 
embarking on a journey of redefining jurisdictional rules of a specialised convention in the light of rules of 
another more general system, as was suggested by the cargo claimants in BAT v Exel.  
                                                                 
hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate 
proceedings...” 
91 See arts 5.1 Br I and 7.1 Br I bis Reg. 
92 See art 46.1 CIM, art 21.1 (c) HambR, art 66 (a) (i i) to (iv) RR and art 71 RR and n.75 above.  
93 Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION on jurisdiction, applicable law and the recognition and enforcement of 
decisions in matters of matrimonial property regimes , COM (2016) 106 final . 
94 Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction a nd the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of and  parental responsibility, repealing 
Regulation (EC) No 1347/2000  (OJ L 338 , 23.12.2003, p.1) and Proposal to Recast this regulation (COM(2016) 411/2). 
95 [2005] 1 A.C. 101; [2004] E.C.R. I-3565. 
96 Case C-68/93 Shevill v Presse Alliance SA  [1995] 2 A.C. 18; [1995] E.C.R. I-415 at [32]. 
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Indeed, it is submitted that all carriage conventions adhere in their unique combination of jurisdictional 
rules to the criteria of proximity and the requirement of predictability and thus legal certainty for 
litigants,97 all having clear rules according to which the parties to a potential dispute can identify the 
courts before which proceedings might be brought. Specialised conventions even where they contain value 
judgments and tailored connecting criteria which may be different to those enshrined in the Brussels I 
Regulation thus ought to be accepted. A general regulation such as Brussels I simply cannot provide for all 
eventualities of all specialised conventions. Thus, very much on the contrary to what had been argued by 
the cargo claimants in BAT v Exel, in order to ensure the underlying EU principles are met one ought not to 
interfere with the specialised convention regimes, applicable between EU Member States and Third States 
contracting to the convention alike. Indeed, the Brussels I Regulation in recital 25 and also in recital 35 of 
the Recast Regulation enshrines the respect for international commitments entered into by the Member 
States stating that “this Regulation should not affect conventions relating to specific matters to which the 
Member States are parties”, thus advocating least interference.   
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The choices made by the negotiators of the various specialised conventions and enshrined in them ought 
to be accepted as valid and as providing a balanced regime of jurisdiction as appropriate for the particular 
mode of transport.98 That jurisdictional matters governed by transport conventions require separate 
consideration from general civil and commercial matters has also been recognised by the Working Group 
of the Council on General Affairs and Policy of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in their 
preparation of a draft Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, excluding 
matters of carriage of goods and persons amongst others from the scope of the draft convention .99  
 
Principles underlying judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters are sufficiently supported by 
applying European rules only as “second stage approach” in matters of lis pendens or enforcement. 
Interference with direct jurisdictional norms of specialised conventions should be avoided lest o ne was 
prepared to create legal uncertainty and destabilise the purpose and functioning of these conventions 
altogether, while ignoring the EU legislator’s intention for them to prevail in observance of international 
pre-existing duties and smooth cooperation with states and in matters across European boundaries. 
 
 
                                                                 
97 See also C. E. Tuo, L. Carpaneto, “Connections and Disconnections between Brussels I Regulation and International 
Conventions on Transport Matters”, Zhornik PFZ, 66 (2-3) (2016) 141, 159, 161 & 180. 
98 See also A. Briggs, Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments, (6th edn, Informa 2015) at 2.49, expressing the view that one 
would have assumed that the choices of the conventions and their l imits are applied under art. 71 Br. I, when 
commenting on the Court of Appeal decision in BAT v Exel. 
99 See the Proposed Draft Text on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments of the Hague Conference 
on Private International Law (completed by the Working Group during its fifth meeting in October 2015) at 
https://assets.hcch.net/docs/01adb7d9-13f3-4199-b1d3-ca62de79360f.pdf (last assessed 3.5.2016). 
